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We develop a model of the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on dividend policy and
empirically examine many of its predictions. Consistent with our main prediction, we
ﬁnd that the level of dividend payout is lower in ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs.
We document that this reduction in dividends associated with CEO overconﬁdence is
greater in ﬁrms with lower growth opportunities, lower cash ﬂow, and greater information
asymmetry. We also show that the magnitude of the positive market reaction to a
dividend-increase announcement is lower for ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs.
Our overall results are consistent with the predictions of our model.
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I. Introduction
The literature on dividend policy is extensive and follows Miller and Modigliani (1961),
who establish the irrelevance of dividend policy in the presence of perfect capital markets.
Subsequent research draws on various market imperfections such as agency problems,
asymmetric information, and taxes to explain the dividend decision. The empirical evi-
dence, however, is inconclusive and much of the variation in dividend policy across ﬁrms
remains unexplained (see Allen and Michaely, 2003). Further, recent survey evidence
in Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) provides scant support from ﬁnancial
executives for many theoretical explanations, such as those based on signalling and taxes.
We examine an alternative explanation based on diﬀerences in managerial beliefs to
shed light on the unexplained variation in dividend policy. Recent research has explored
behavioral explanations of various corporate policies. For instance, Malmendier and
Tate (2005) classify managerial beliefs using an overconﬁdence measure and document
that ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs exhibit a greater sensitivity of investment
spending to internal cash ﬂow.
1 Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that overconﬁdent
CEOs are more likely to engage in acquisitions that are value-destroying. Malmendier,
Tate, and Yan (2007) argue that overconﬁdent managers perceive their ﬁrms to be
undervalued and are reluctant to raise funds through (costly) external sources. They
document that the reluctance of overconﬁdent CEOs to raise funds through external
sources leads to both a pecking order of ﬁnancing and debt conservatism. In short,
overconﬁdent CEOs appear to prefer internal to external funds.
The ﬁndings in Malmendier and Tate (2005) and in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007)
provide interesting and important implications for dividend policy. An overconﬁdent
CEO’s preference for internal over external funds suggests that the CEO is likely to adopt
a lower dividend payout to enhance the availability of internal funds. We elaborate on
1Overconﬁdence is deﬁned as overestimation of the precision of one’s information or, equivalently,
underestimation of risk. The ﬁnding that people are overconﬁdent is one of the most robust in the
psychology of judgment. See DeBondt and Thaler (1995), Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (1982), and
Russo and Schoemaker (1990).
1this key idea and develop a simple model of the interaction between dividend policy and
CEO overconﬁdence. The main testable prediction of the model is that an overconﬁdent
CEO pays a lower level of dividends relative to a rational CEO. This prediction is also
robust to an extension of our model with alternative modeling assumptions. The model
also predicts the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on the dividend payout to be weaker
for ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities. In addition, the model predicts the stock
price response to announcements of dividend changes to be an increasing function of the
informativeness of the announcement about CEO overconﬁdence. We test the model’s
predictions, along with other implications drawn from the dividend literature, using a
panel data of large U.S. companies over the period, 1980-1994. We employ the measures
of CEO overconﬁdence derived by and used in Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) and
in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007).
Our results indicate that the level of dividend payout is lower in ﬁrms managed by
overconﬁdent CEOs. This result is robust to alternative measures of CEO overconﬁdence
and to several control variables. We also examine the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on
the relation between dividend policy and growth, cash ﬂow, and the level of asymmetric
information, respectively. Consistent with previous evidence, we ﬁnd a negative relation
between growth and dividend payout. However, we show that the diﬀerence in the
dividend payout between higher-growth and lower-growth ﬁrms is smaller for ﬁrms with
overconﬁdent CEOs. Alternatively, the reduction in dividend payout caused by CEO
overconﬁdence is smaller in higher-growth ﬁrms, which is consistent with the prediction
of our model. We also ﬁnd that the positive relation between dividend payout and cash
ﬂow, documented in previous studies, is stronger in ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs. One
interpretation of this ﬁnding is that overconﬁdent CEOs perceive their cash ﬂow to be
greater than it actually is and thus adopt a higher dividend payout relative to rational
CEOs. We also show that the negative eﬀect of asymmetric information on dividend
payout is stronger for ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs. With asymmetric information,
overconﬁdent CEOs perceive a higher wedge between the cost of internal and external
funds and, thus, respond by adopting a lower dividend payout to enhance the availability
of internal funds.
2Finally, we analyze the stock-market response to dividend changes by identifying
announcements of dividend increases of at least 10% made by our sample ﬁrms over
the sample period. We control for the endogeneity of the dividend-increase decision
and estimate a multivariate regression model to investigate the relation between CEO
overconﬁdence and the stock-market response to the dividend-increase announcement.
Our results here indicate that the magnitude of the positive stock price response is
higher for ﬁrms with uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence than for ﬁrms whose CEOs
have previously been identiﬁed as overconﬁdent. This result is consistent with our
hypothesis that dividends provide information about CEO overconﬁdence – dividend
increases indicate lower CEO overconﬁdence – and that this informativeness is higher
when there is greater uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence.
We make three contributions to the dividend policy literature: First, we model and
test the relation between managerial overconﬁdence and dividend policy to show that
CEO overconﬁdence aﬀects dividend policy. Second, we examine the eﬀect of CEO
overconﬁdence on the relation between dividend policy and cash ﬂow, growth oppor-
tunities, and the level of asymmetric information, respectively. Growth opportunities,
cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm size (a measure of asymmetric information) appear to be the three
most important factors that aﬀect dividend policy (see Smith and Watts, 1992; Fama
and French, 2001, 2002). Third, the ﬁndings on the stock market response to announce-
ments of dividend increases by overconﬁdent CEOs indicate that the market recognizes
the relation between CEO overconﬁdence and dividend policy. Our results thus provide
an alternative explanation for the stock market response to announcements of dividend
changes. Taken together, our results in this paper document a robust eﬀect of CEO
overconﬁdence on dividend policy.
Our paper contributes to the growing literature on behavioral corporate ﬁnance. Hir-
shleifer (2001) and Barberis and Thaler (2003) survey the literature that attempts to
explain asset pricing and return patterns based on behavioral characteristics of investors.
The literature on behavioral corporate ﬁnance that examines the relation between cor-
porate policies and the behavioral characteristics of corporate managers and investors
is surveyed by Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler (2007). Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey
3(2007), Hackbarth (2008), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), and Malmendier, Tate,
and Yan (2007) examine the eﬀect of overconﬁdence in top executives on corporate ﬁ-
nance policies. Bernardo and Welch (2002), Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2009), and
Goel and Thakor (2008) endogenize CEO overconﬁdence and consider the impact of
CEO overconﬁdence on shareholders. Heaton (2002) examines how managerial opti-
mism aﬀects corporate policies, de Meza and Southey (1996) and Landier and Thesmar
(2008) examine ﬁnancial contracting with optimistic managers, and Bergman and Jen-
ter (2007) link stock option compensation to employee optimism. Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) show that diﬀerences in style across managers signiﬁcantly explain corporate de-
cisions and performance. Our results on the relation between CEO overconﬁdence and
dividend policy corroborate the central thesis of this literature that behavioral charac-
teristics of CEOs aﬀect corporate ﬁnance policies.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II, we develop a simple model of dividend
policy and CEO overconﬁdence. Section III describes the data and method, and Section
IV presents the empirical results. Section V extends our model to endogenize the cost of
external ﬁnancing and decouple investment and payout decisions. Section VI summarizes
our ﬁndings and discusses the implications of the study.
II. Model
In this section, we present a model of investment and dividend policies of a ﬁrm. We
determine the optimal policies of a rational CEO and then examine how the policies of an
overconﬁdent CEO diﬀer from those of the rational CEO. We use a parsimonious model
to derive the ﬁrm’s optimal dividend policy and use that as a benchmark to analyze how
CEO overconﬁdence aﬀects the dividend policy.
A. Model Basics. This subsection speciﬁes the timing of events, the preferences and
actions of the CEO, and the information structure.
A.1. Firm. Consider an all-equity ﬁrm with a CEO who acts in the interest of share-
holders. The number of shares is normalized to one and all investors are risk neutral.
The risk-free interest rate is zero.
4A.2. Dates. There are three dates. At date 0, the CEO and the market observe signals
about a project available to the ﬁrm. At date 1, the CEO declares a dividend and/or
raises external ﬁnancing, and also invests capital in the project.
2 At date 2, the cash
ﬂows from the project are realized. The cash ﬂows are used to pay oﬀ creditors who
provided external ﬁnancing at date 1 and to pay dividends to original shareholders.
We assume that the CEO wants to maximize the value to all the investors in the ﬁrm,
instead of favoring one set of investors over another.
A.3. Project. An investment I ≥ 0 in the project at date 1 yields Y f(I) at date 2
where Y , the project quality, is a random variable normally distributed with mean µy
and precision ηy (standard deviation 1
ηy) and function f is increasing and concave with
f(0) = 0.
A.4. Payout and External Financing. The ﬁrm starts with cash C0 > 0 at date 0. The
CEO declares dividend D ≥ 0 and raises external ﬁnancing F ≥ 0 at date 1. External
ﬁnancing is costly so the net cash received by the ﬁrm is (1−β)F where β is the cost of
external ﬁnancing with 0 ≤ β < 1. The amount of dividend paid is limited by the total
cash available - the initial cash and the net cash raised through external ﬁnancing. Any
cash remaining after dividend payout is invested in the project.
A.5. Signal and CEO’s Problem. The CEO observes a signal s about the project at
date 0. The signal is normally distributed with mean equal to the project quality Y
and precision ηs. The expected value of the project quality conditional on the signal s
is calculated using Bayes rule as




The initial beliefs about the project follow the condition:
µyf
0(0) ≤ 1. (2)
2Dividends and share repurchases are perfect substitutes in our model. Moreover, the CEO is indif-
ferent between them as the CEO is acting in the interest of all shareholders and ignores any wealth
transfer that may occur among shareholders with share repurchases. Our results about dividends thus
generalize to total payout.
5This condition stipulates that prior to observing a signal, the project has negative
present value and does not merit any investment from the shareholders’ perspective.
Thus, the CEO takes the investment decision only after observing the signal about the
project. The CEO chooses a policy (I,D,F) to simultaneously determine the levels of
investment, dividend, and external ﬁnancing based on the signal s. His problem is
max
I,D,F
Z (s,I,D,F) ≡ y (s)f (I) + D − F , (3)
subject to
I = C0 − D + (1 − β)F , and (4)
I ≥ 0,D ≥ 0,F ≥ 0. (5)
The objective in (3) is the ﬁrm value calculated as the net cash ﬂow to all investors
across dates 1 and 2 and constraint (4) is the cash clearing identity on date 1. We will call
a policy (I,D,F) feasible if it satisﬁes (4) and (5). We deﬁne Z (s,I) as the maximum
value of the CEO’s objective Z (s,I,D,F) over all feasible policies with investment I.
B. Equilibrium Investment, Financing, and Dividend Policies. This subsection
characterizes how the CEO’s corporate investment, ﬁnancing, and dividend decisions
depend on his inference about the project quality based on the signal. The results of
this section do not depend on whether the CEO rationally interprets the signal but only
require that the CEO associate a higher signal with a higher expected project quality,
i.e., dy/ds > 0. The next subsection will examine how overconﬁdence impacts CEO’s
policies.
Proposition 1. If external ﬁnancing is costless, i.e., β = 0, then
(a) if the signal is below a threshold, s ≤ s, there is no investment, and the net
payout (dividend minus external capital raised) equals the initial cash C0, and
(b) if the signal is above the threshold, s > s, investment is positive and an increasing
function of s while net payout is a decreasing function of s,
where the threshold s is deﬁned by y (s) = 1/f0(0).
This proposition is straightforward. A higher value of the signal s suggests a higher
project quality and results in a greater investment. However, if the signal is suﬃciently
6low, the CEO does not invest in the project. Since external ﬁnancing is costless, the
dividend or the amount of external ﬁnancing is indeterminate. The diﬀerence of the
two, the net payout, equals the cash available minus the investment in the project, and
is thus decreasing in the realized signal. In the following analysis, external ﬁnancing is
assumed to be costly, i.e., β > 0.
Lemma 1. Paying a dividend and raising external ﬁnancing are mutually exclusive on
date 1. Speciﬁcally,















The right hand side of the equation for Z (s,I) shows that the CEO’s objective equals
the expected cash ﬂow from the project, the ﬁrst term, minus the net cash raised from
investors, the second term. The net cash raised is either the negative of dividend payment
or equals the new capital raised on date 1. The above lemma shows that the cost of
external ﬁnancing makes it ineﬃcient to distribute dividends and raise external ﬁnancing
on date 1. Thus, if the ﬁrm pays a dividend, it does not raise external ﬁnancing and if it
raises external ﬁnancing, it does not pay a dividend.3 Since we have assumed a positive
cost of raising external ﬁnancing but zero cost of paying a dividend, the tradeoﬀ that
the ﬁrm faces between a marginal dollar on date 0 and a marginal dollar on date 1
diﬀers in the two scenarios: the scenario when the signal is low and the ﬁrm pays a
dividend and the scenario when the signal is high and the ﬁrm raises external ﬁnancing.
These scenarios are represented by the two terms in the maximum function in the above
equation for Z (s,I).
Proposition 2. The investment, dividend, and ﬁnancing policies depend on the signal
s in the following manner:
3The model can be extended with information asymmetry about cash balance or gradual information
arrival to accommodate the possibility of simultaneous dividend payout and equity issues. However,
this issue is tangential to the focus of the paper.
7(a) for lowest signal values, s ≤ s, there is no investment, no external capital is
raised, and the initial cash C0 is paid out as a dividend,
(b) for higher signal values, s < s < ˆ s, investment is positive but less than C0 and
is an increasing function of s, dividend is positive and a decreasing function of
s, and external capital is not raised,
(c) for even higher signal values, ˆ s ≤ s < ¯ s, investment equals C0, dividend is not
declared, and external capital is not raised, and
(d) for highest signal values, s > ¯ s, investment exceeds C0 and is an increasing
function of s, dividend is not declared, and the amount of external ﬁnancing is












(1 − β)y (¯ s)
. (6)
This proposition shows that the range of the value of the signal s can be partitioned
into four continuous regions, which characterize diﬀerent corporate policies. The ﬁrst
region, the full-payout region, corresponds to signal values so low that the CEO believes
that the return on any investment is negative. In this region, the cash balance C0 is
paid out as a dividend. The partial-payout region consists of higher signal values such
that the CEO believes the marginal return is positive with no investment but negative if
the entire cash balance C0 is invested, so the CEO invests a fraction of C0 and pays out
the rest as a dividend. The zero-payout region consists of even higher signal values such
that the CEO believes that the marginal return with investment of C0 is positive but
less than the cost of external ﬁnancing, so the CEO invests all of C0 but does not raise
external ﬁnancing. The negative-payout region consists of the highest values of the signal
s for which the CEO believes the marginal return from an investment of C0 exceeds the
marginal cost of external ﬁnancing, so the CEO raises external ﬁnancing to invest more
than C0. Investment is an increasing function of the signal s in the partial-payout region
and the negative-payout region. Thus, the dividend is a decreasing function of s and
the external ﬁnancing is an increasing function of s.
C. Impact of CEO Overconﬁdence. The previous subsection characterized the CEO’s
investment, ﬁnancing, and payout choices as functions of his inference about the project
8quality. This inference depends on the CEO’s signal as well as his beliefs about the
precision of the signal. A rational CEO correctly believes that the precision of the sig-
nal is ηs and his inference about the project quality is given by (1). In contrast, an
overconﬁdent CEO overestimates the precision of his signal.4 Speciﬁcally, a CEO with
degree of overconﬁdence C > 1 believes that the signal s has precision Cηs and is more
informative than it really is.5 He estimates the expected value of the project quality
conditional on the signal s as




An overconﬁdent CEO determines investment, dividend, and external ﬁnancing as a
function of his signal in qualitatively the same way as the rational CEO. However, his
decisions diﬀer from those of a rational CEO due to diﬀerences in how they interpret
the signal about . The following result explains how CEO overconﬁdence and ﬁnancing
costs inﬂuence corporate policies.
Proposition 3. (a) Investment is a weakly increasing function of CEO overconﬁdence
and cash balance and a weakly decreasing function of the cost of external ﬁnancing. (b)
Dividend is a weakly decreasing function of CEO overconﬁdence and a weakly increasing
function of cash balance. (c) The amount of capital raised through external ﬁnancing is
a weakly increasing function of CEO overconﬁdence and a weakly decreasing function of
cash balance and the cost of external ﬁnancing.
4This deﬁnition of overconﬁdence is consistent with most of the literature on behavioral ﬁnance,
which includes Barberis and Thaler (2003), Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2007), Bernardo and
Welch (2001), Gervais, Heaton, and Odean (2009), Hackbarth (2008), and Hirshleifer (2001). Daniel,
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) list psychological evidence about overconﬁdence. Malmendier
and Tate (2005) consider this as well as another interpretation of overconﬁdence: an overconﬁdent
CEO may overestimate the cash ﬂows of his ﬁrm. This latter interpretation is often referred to as
overoptimism (see Hackbarth (2008), Heaton (2002), and Hirshleifer (2001)). As Hirshleifer (2001)
points out, overconﬁdence may lead to overoptimism.
5Our assumption that CEO overconﬁdence is about uncertain future investment opportunities rather
than more predictable current cash ﬂow is consistent with the psychological evidence that overconﬁdence
is rampant in diﬃcult tasks and is eliminated in very easy tasks (see Griﬃn and Tversky (1992) and
Klayman, Soll, Gonz´ alez-Vallejo, and Barlas(1999)).
9The proposition shows that the more overconﬁdent a CEO is, the more he will invest.
The intuition is that overconﬁdence causes the CEO to overestimate the precision of his
signal and hence to overreact to the signal. When a signal is above average, a rational
CEO raises his expectation of project quality An overconﬁdent CEO also does so but
overreacts and arrives at an expectation of project quality that is higher than what a
rational CEO would arrive at. On the other hand, when the signal is below average, a
rational CEO lowers his expectation of project quality An overconﬁdent CEO also does
so but by overreacting, he arrives at too low an expectation of project quality. Thus,
overreaction may cause an overconﬁdent CEO to be optimistic or pessimistic about the
project. His optimism, in the case of a good signal, causes him to invest too much in
the project relative to a rational CEO. On the other hand, his pessimism, which is asso-
ciated with lower signal values, causes him to not invest in the project and this action
is indistinguishable from that of the rational CEO. Thus, CEO overconﬁdence leads to
overinvestment but not underinvestment. The proposition establishes that this invest-
ment distortion is greater when the CEO is more overconﬁdent. Further, the investment
distortion directly leads to distortions in dividend policy and external ﬁnancing policy.
Since, an overconﬁdent CEO overinvests relative to a rational CEO, he declares lower
dividends and raises more external ﬁnancing than a rational CEO.
We now relate the results of Proposition 3, a centerpiece of our model, to the existing
empirical literature along three dimensions.
Investment Policy. Part (a) of the proposition asserts that investment is positively re-
lated to CEO overconﬁdence. This implication has been empirically veriﬁed in Mal-
mendier and Tate (2005) and in Malmendier and Tate (2008). They show that over-
conﬁdent CEOs invest more if internal funds are available. However, they also argue
that overconﬁdent CEOs curtail investments ﬁnanced by issuing risky securities because
they view external funds as unduly costly. While Proposition 3 also shows that in-
vestment is sensitive to cash balance, it is not obvious that this sensitivity is always
higher for overconﬁdent CEOs than for rational CEOs. The reason for this divergence is
that we assume an exogenous cost of external ﬁnancing that is a deadweight cost from
the perspective of the ﬁrm and does not depend on whether the CEO is rational or
10overconﬁdent. Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) assume that the CEO views external
ﬁnancing as too costly because of the diﬀerence of opinion between the CEO and the
new investors. This cost is simply a transfer of wealth among diﬀerent investors of the
ﬁrm rather than a deadweight cost and its impact on the CEO’s investment policy de-
pends on the CEO’s objective. If the CEO acts in the interest of all shareholders, as we
assume, this cost will not impact the CEO’s investment decisions. If the CEO acts in the
interest of old shareholders, as assumed in Malmendier and Tate, the deadweight cost
of external ﬁnancing is independent of whether the CEO is rational or overconﬁdent.
On the other hand, the perceived underpricing of newly issued securities is seen as a
cost only by the overconﬁdent CEO, causing the overconﬁdent CEO’s investment to be
more sensitive to availability of internal funds. This distinction is not important for our
dividend results because, in equilibrium, the ﬁrm does not raise any external ﬁnancing
when it pays out dividend.
Financing Policy. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007) examine the relation between
CEO overconﬁdence and ﬁnancing choices. They document two main ﬁndings. First,
conditional on accessing public markets for external ﬁnancing, overconﬁdent CEOs are
more likely to raise debt than equity. Second, overconﬁdent CEOs are less likely to
raise external ﬁnancing. The two results together show that CEO overconﬁdence leads
to a greater inclination to follow a pecking order: internal capital is preferred to issu-
ing debt, which in turn is preferred to issuing equity. Proposition 2 is consistent with
the ﬁrst ﬁnding as the ﬁrm (in our model) prefers internal funds over external ﬁnanc-
ing. We obtain this result by assuming an exogenous cost of external ﬁnancing while
in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007), the CEO perceives this cost as a result of the
diﬀerence between his beliefs and those of the investors. The CEO’s preference for debt
over equity arises in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007) because the diﬀerence of beliefs
aﬀects equity value more than debt value. We obtain the same result in our model if we
assume that the CEO acts in the interest of old shareholders rather than all investors
in the ﬁrm. Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007) point out that their second result about
overconﬁdent CEOs being less likely to access external capital may reverse if investment
is endogenized as overconﬁdent CEOs invest more. This is exactly what Proposition 3
11shows. However, the empirical evidence in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007) shows
that overconﬁdent CEOs are less likely to access external markets. This ﬁnding suggests
that CEOs may care more about old shareholders and an overconﬁdent CEO’s concern
about underpricing of new securities dominates the preference for overinvestment based
on biased beliefs.
Dividend Policy. The third corporate policy that Proposition 3 addresses is dividend
policy. To our knowledge, the relation between dividend policy and CEO overconﬁdence
has not been explored comprehensively. We examine our predictions about this relation
empirically.
A natural questions that arises is: How do shareholders react to the ﬁrm’s dividend
policy decisions? An overconﬁdent CEO who acts in the interest of all shareholders
believes that his investment, ﬁnancing, and dividend policies are maximizing the wealth
of all investors in the ﬁrm. Investors may disagree with the CEO, which may impact
the price at which the ﬁrm can issue new securities. This disagreement doesn’t aﬀect
CEO actions as pricing of securities only aﬀects the sharing of wealth among diﬀerent
investors of the ﬁrm and the CEO doesn’t care about short-term price performance.
Nonetheless, the share price reaction to the CEO’s policies is still an interesting issue
and can be used to test the implications of our theoretical model.
Allen and Michaely (2003) note that the market on average reacts positively to an-
nouncements of increases in dividends and negatively to announcements of dividend
decreases. The most common explanation for this reaction is the signaling hypothesis
– higher dividends are announced by the managers to signal higher future cash ﬂows.
Allen and Michaely (2003) point out a problem with the theory; there is little empiri-
cal evidence that higher earnings follow larger dividends. Thus, they conclude that if
ﬁrms use dividends as a signal, the signal is not about future growth in earnings or
cash ﬂows. In that spirit, we show below that dividends may convey information about
CEO overconﬁdence. In our model, the CEO’s actions depend on his interpretation
of his signal, which is determined not only by the signal itself but also by the CEO’s
overconﬁdence. Thus, the CEO’s dividend announcement on date 1 conveys incremental
information to the market about the ﬁrm’s investment opportunities as well as about
12the CEO’s overconﬁdence. The following result shows how investors react to a dividend
announcement.
Proposition 4. Suppose the CEO can be rational or overconﬁdent. If there is no in-
formation asymmetry about the project (i.e., the CEO’s signal s is also observed by the
investors) and the investors do not know the CEO’s degree of overconﬁdence C, then
the share price response to a dividend announcement is increasing in the dividend an-
nounced. If there is information asymmetry about the project (i.e., the CEO’s signal s
is private information) and investors do not know the CEO’s degree of overconﬁdence,
then the sensitivity of share price response to dividend announced is increasing in the
uncertainty about the CEO’s overconﬁdence.
The market response to a dividend announcement depends on what the market learns
about the quality of the project and about the CEO’s overconﬁdence from the divi-
dend announcement. Proposition 4 shows that when the market knows the quality of
the project, it is learning only about the CEO’s overconﬁdence. Since overconﬁdent
CEOs overinvest, a higher dividend indicates lower overinvestment and hence results in
a higher stock price. When there is information asymmetry about the project quality in
addition to uncertainty about the CEO’s overconﬁdence, then the stock price response
will also depend on what the market learns about the project quality. Since investment
is increasing in project quality and the dividend is decreasing in project quality (see
Proposition 2), a higher dividend signals lower project quality, thus reducing the stock
price. However, the stock price response also reﬂects the learning about CEO’s overcon-
ﬁdence. The latter eﬀect leads to an increase in stock price because a higher dividend
indicates lower overconﬁdence and lower overinvestment. The net change in stock price
depends on which eﬀect dominates. Proposition 4 shows that when there is greater
uncertainty about the CEO’s overconﬁdence, the stock price will be more sensitive to
the amount of dividend declared.6
6Bouwman (2008) analyzes the stock price reaction to dividend announcements by managers who
may be rational or optimistic and ﬁnds that announcement returns are higher for dividend increases
by optimistic CEOs than by rational CEOs. Our model does not yield this result regardless of whether
investors can distinguish between rational and overconﬁdent CEOs.
13We have so far assumed that the overconﬁdent CEO always misinterprets information
about the investment opportunity. However, the eﬀect of overconﬁdence is strongest for
new, private information and weaker for information that is widely held and accepted (see
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998). A CEO’s beliefs about some investment
opportunities may be based on private information while for others, the CEO’s beliefs
may depend on widely available public information. CEO overconﬁdence will have a
greater impact in the former case than in the latter. To incorporate this aspect of
overconﬁdence, we now allow the ﬁrm to have access to a typical project and a novel
project. The novel project’s payoﬀ replaces the single project we have considered so
far and now the signal s is informative about the novel project. The signal provides
no incremental information about the payoﬀ distribution of the typical project. It is
common knowledge that an investment I ≥ 0 in the typical project yields Qf(I) where
Q > 0 is a positive constant known to all. We assume that the projects are mutually
exclusive so the ﬁrm cannot simultaneously invest in both the typical project and the
novel project.
The CEO now determines the levels of investment, dividend, and external ﬁnancing
based on the signal s and also decides whether the investment, if any, is made in the
typical project or the novel project.
Proposition 5. (a) The diﬀerence between an overconﬁdent CEO’s investment and a
rational CEO’s investment is a decreasing function of Q. (b) The diﬀerence between the
dividend payout by a rational CEO and that by an overconﬁdent CEO is a decreasing
function of Q.
The intuition behind Proposition 5 is as follows. The diﬀerence between the policies of
the rational CEO and the overconﬁdent CEO arises because the two CEOs diﬀer in their
interpretation of the quality of the novel project. However, when a CEO has a choice
between investing in the typical project about which all information is public and in
the novel project with some private information, CEO overconﬁdence impacts his views
solely about the novel project because overconﬁdence acts only on the private signal and
not on public information. Thus, CEO overconﬁdence will aﬀect corporate policies if he
chooses to invest in the novel project but not if he invests in the typical project. If the
14typical project has high quality (Q), then the CEO is less likely to invest in the novel
project, and hence overconﬁdence is less likely to inﬂuence the CEO’s dividend decision.
For our empirical analysis, we derive and test the following four hypotheses from our
model:
Hypothesis 1. Overconﬁdent CEOs declare smaller dividends than rational CEOs. This
hypothesis follows from Proposition 3.
Hypothesis 2. The diﬀerence between the dividend payments by a rational CEO and an
overconﬁdent CEO is smaller in a ﬁrm with a typical project of high-quality (Q). This
follows from Proposition 5.
The variable Q can be measured empirically by the market-to-book ratio of assets. A
higher-quality typical project will lead to a higher valuation and to a higher market-to-
book ratio, when the distribution of project quality for the novel project is ﬁxed. CEO
overconﬁdence leads to a smaller dividend payment but higher growth (market-to book
ratio) mitigates the reduction in the dividend caused by CEO overconﬁdence. Therefore,
in a regression model with dividend payout as the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient on
the interaction term of CEO overconﬁdence and growth should be positive.
Hypothesis 3. The stock price reaction to an increase in dividend is positive if there is
uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence but not about the project quality. This hypothesis
follows from Proposition 4.
Hypothesis 4. The sensitivity of the stock price response to the dividend increase is
increasing in the uncertainty about the CEO overconﬁdence. This hypothesis also follows
from Proposition 4.
III. Data and Variables
A. Data. Our initial sample of ﬁrms is identical to that in Malmendier and Tate (2005,
2008) and in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007), and is based on the sample of 477 ﬁrms
in Hall and Liebman (1998) and in Yermack (1995). To be a part of this sample, a ﬁrm
must appear at least four times in one of the lists of the largest U.S. companies compiled
15by Forbes magazine over the period, 1984-1994. This data set provides detailed infor-
mation on CEO stock and stock option holdings. The dynamics of the option grants
and holdings provide a reasonably clear picture of how a CEO rebalances his or her
portfolio over his/her tenure. Malmendier and Tate (2008) use the data on option hold-
ings to derive their portfolio-based overconﬁdence measures.7 They rule out alternative
explanations for these portfolio-based measures and argue that the measures capture the
notion of CEO overconﬁdence quite well. They also use data from articles about CEOs
in the business press to derive alternative press-based overconﬁdence measures. We use
these overconﬁdence measures in our analysis of dividend policy.
Overconﬁdence is inferred in our sample from the CEO’s option-exercise behavior.
There are two reasons why an overconﬁdent CEO is less likely to exercise an in-the-
money stock option than a rational CEO. First, Section II shows that the overconﬁdent
CEO’s investments are based on favorable private information. Since the CEO thinks the
information is more precise than it actually is, he is overoptimistic about the expected
value of the ﬁrm’s future payoﬀ (expected-value eﬀect). He perceives his ﬁrm’s stock
to be undervalued and is reluctant to exercise stock options. Second, the overconﬁdent
CEO underestimates the volatility of the future payoﬀ (volatility eﬀect) whose eﬀect on
the CEO’s exercise behavior is less obvious. While a lower stock return volatility reduces
the value of the option to a diversiﬁed investor, the reduction in the risk imposed by
the option on the underdiversiﬁed CEO increases the CEO’s utility from holding on to
the option. An overconﬁdent CEO, thus, delays exercising the option compared to a
rational CEO. Our replication of the Hall and Murphy (2002) analysis shows (see Figure
7Option grants usually represent a large component of CEO compensation packages. These options
cannot be traded and the ﬁrms prohibit CEOs to hedge this exposure via short-selling their company
stock. In addition, CEOs have their human capital invested in the ﬁrm. These eﬀects in unison cause the
CEO to be underdiversiﬁed and highly exposed to ﬁrm-speciﬁc risk. A CEO should exercise the options
well before the expiration date, given rational exercise thresholds, to reduce the underdiversiﬁcation.
But, overconﬁdent CEOs may hold the options longer (than rational CEOs) if they believe that the
beneﬁts of leaving the options unexercised outweigh the costs of underdiversiﬁcation. Malmendier and
Tate use this rationale to derive their portfolio-based overconﬁdence measures based on the option-
exercise behavior of CEOs. For further details on these CEO overconﬁdence measures, see Malmendier
and Tate (2005, 2008) and Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007).
16Figure 1. Stock Return Volatility and Option Exercise Boundary












































1) that the threshold moneyness for exercising an option with one year to maturity
changes from slightly above 40% when the stock volatility is 30% to about 50% when
the stock volatility is lowered to 25%, leaving all other parameters unchanged. Thus,
both eﬀects make overconﬁdent CEOs less likely to exercise stock options than their
rational counterparts.
From the panel data on the original sample of 477 ﬁrms, we eliminate ﬁrm-year ob-
servations for ﬁnancial ﬁrms (SIC 6000-6999), utilities (SIC 4900-4999), and regulated
telephone companies (SIC 4813). Our data cover the period, 1980-1994. We supple-
ment the above data on CEO overconﬁdence with various items from the COMPUSTAT
database to construct our control variables.
17B. Variables. The various measures of overconﬁdence that we use in our study are as
follows:
Longholder: This indicator variable identiﬁes CEOs who hold an option until the year
of expiration at least once during their tenure even though the option is at least 40%
in the money. Malmendier and Tate (2008) use the calibrated exercise threshold of 40%
based on the model in Hall and Murphy (2002) and assume that a CEO has a constant
relative risk-aversion of 3 and 67% of his or her wealth is in the company stock. The
Longholder variable represents a ﬁxed eﬀect over all of a CEO’s years.
Pre-/Post-Longholder: Pre- and Post-Longholder represent a split of the Longholder
(indicator) variable. These two measures, also based on the CEO’s option-exercise be-
havior, allow for time variation over the sample period and eliminate forward-looking
information in the classiﬁcation of a CEO. Post-Longholder equals one in all those CEO-
years that follow the year in which the CEO, for the ﬁrst time, holds an option until the
last year of expiration. Pre-Longholder equals one for those CEO years where Longholder
equals one and Post-Longholder equals zero.8
TOTALconﬁdent: Malmendier and Tate (2008) collect data on the CEO from articles
in The New York Times, Business Week, Financial Times, The Economist, and The
Wall Street Journal. For CEO i and sample year t, they compare the number of articles
that refer to the CEO with the terms ”conﬁdent” or ”conﬁdence” (ait) and ”optimistic”
or ”optimism” (bit) to the number of articles that refer to the CEO as ”not conﬁdent”
(cit) or ”not optimistic” (dit), and ”reliable,” ”cautious,” ”conservative,” ”practical,”
”frugal,” or ”steady” (eit). They use these data to construct the following press-based







s=1 ais + bis >
Pt−1
s=1 cis + dis + eis
0 otherwise
As in Malmendier and Tate (2008), when we use TOTALconﬁdent, we control for the
8For robustness, we also use the Holder67 measure from Malmendier and Tate (2008) and from
Malmendier, Tate, and Yan (2007) despite its lack of power. Only 40% of the observations where the
Longholder equals 1 or 0 fall in the Holder67 category. In other words, we lose 60% of the observations
when we use the Holder67 variable.
18total number of press mentions of a CEO (TOTALmentions) over the same period (i.e.,
over all the preceding sample years). The reason is that a press bias towards positive
mentions might imply a positive association between press mentions of ”conﬁdent” or
”optimistic” and the total number of mentions.
The extant empirical literature on dividends indicates that dividend policy is strongly
inﬂuenced by growth opportunities, cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm size (Fama and French, 2001,
2002; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Smith and Watts, 1993). The overall evidence indicates
dividends are positively related to both ﬁrm size and cash ﬂow and negatively related
to growth opportunities. Fenn and Liang (2001) also document the importance of stock
and option ownership in determining dividend policy.
In the empirical analysis, we control for CEO stock ownership, CEO option ownership,
growth opportunities, cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm size.9 The CEO’s stock ownership, termed as
Stock Ownership, equals the fraction of the company stock owned by the CEO and
his immediate family as a fraction of common shares outstanding. The CEO’s option
ownership, termed as Vested Options, equals the ratio of the CEO’s holdings of vested
options, exercisable within six months, as a fraction of common shares outstanding. We
use the natural logarithm of sales, termed as Log of Sales, as a proxy for ﬁrm size.
For robustness, we also use the natural logarithm of the book value of assets.10 We
calculate Growth as the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets,
where the market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value
of total assets minus the book value of equity11; Cash Flow as the ratio of operating
income before depreciation to book value of assets (Opler and Titman, 1993; Fenn and
Liang, 2001). We follow Fenn and Liang (2001) and calculate the Dividend Payout,
9We thank Ulrike Malmendier for providing us the data on both CEO stock ownership and CEO
option ownership.
10The positive relation between size and dividend policy that is widely documented in the literature
is consistent with several explanations. For instance, larger ﬁrms are viewed as having less asymmetric
information and lower ﬁnancing costs (see Fenn and Liang, 2001; Opler and Titman, 1993; Smith and
Watts, 1992). In addition, larger ﬁrms are considered to have less volatile cash ﬂows. Fama and French
(2002) argue that ﬁrm size serves as a reasonable proxy for cash ﬂow volatility, and ﬁrms with lower
cash ﬂow volatility are predicted to pay higher dividends (Fenn and Liang, 2001).
11See Smith and Watts (1992), Opler and Titman (1993), and Fenn and Liang (2001).
19our dependent variable, as the ratio of common stock dividends to the market value of
equity.
IV. Empirical Results
A. Cross-Sectional Analysis. First, we provide univariate comparisons between the
subsample of ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs (i.e., Longholder = 1) and that with rational
CEOs (Longholder = 0). Next, we perform a multivariate analysis by estimating a
random-eﬀects tobit model of dividend payout as a function of CEO overconﬁdence (or
Longholder) and the various control variables discussed above. By using a multivariate
tobit analysis, we control for all the relevant factors while examining the marginal impact
of CEO overconﬁdence on dividend policy. To estimate our tobit model, we use those
observations for which data are available on all our variables.
The summary statistics in Table I show that ﬁrms with Longholder (i.e., overconﬁdent)
CEOs have a lower dividend yield, which is our main variable of interest. In addition,
ﬁrms with Longholder CEOs have a higher CEO option ownership and a higher CEO
tenure. The associations between Longholder and CEO option ownership/tenure are
likely to arise mechanically given the construction of the Longholder measure. We
control for these variables in our empirical analysis.
[Table I here]
Next, we estimate a random-eﬀects tobit model of dividend payout on the panel data
for our sample ﬁrms. The independent variables are stock ownership, vested options,
Longholder, growth, cash ﬂow, and log of sales. The results from Model 1 in Table II
indicate that the level of dividend payout is negatively related to Longholder, growth,
stock ownership, and vested options. The coeﬃcients on Longholder, growth, and vested
options are statistically signiﬁcant at the 1% level, and the coeﬃcient on stock ownership
is statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The results also indicate that the level of
dividend payout is positively related to ﬁrm size, as measured by the logarithm of sales,
and to cash ﬂow. The coeﬃcients on size and cash ﬂow are statistically signiﬁcant at
the 1% level. The result with respect to ﬁrm size is robust when we use the logarithm
of the book value of assets.
20The negative coeﬃcient on Longholder indicates that the level of dividend payout is
negatively related to the level of CEO overconﬁdence and conforms to our main testable
prediction (Hypothesis 1).12 The rest of the results are consistent with previous evidence
(see Fama and French, 2001, 2002; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Smith and Watts, 1992).
In untabulated analyses, we estimate a random-eﬀects tobit model with an R&D
intensity variable in place of the growth variable. We calculate R&D intensity as the ratio
of R&D expenditures to book value of assets. However, R&D expenditures are available
for only 60% of the observations. Except for the nonsigniﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on
stock ownership, the results remain robust to this speciﬁcation. We use an alternative
measure of cash ﬂow calculated as operating income before depreciation less capital
expenditures, scaled by the book value of assets (as in Fenn and Liang, 2001). Again,
our results remain robust to this speciﬁcation. Our overall results also remain robust to
the inclusion of cash balances and to an alternative measure of growth, calculated as the
annual percentage increase in assets (see Fama and French, 2002). Finally, our results
are also robust to the inclusion of industry eﬀects and when we winsorize the data at
the 99th percentile and the 1st percentile (where applicable).13
In all the models, a likelihood ratio test strongly rejects a tobit model on pooled data
and thus favors a random-eﬀects speciﬁcation. We test for collinearity by computing
the variance inﬂation factors for the independent variables used in Model 1, Table II.
The highest value for the variance inﬂation factor is 1.61 with an average value of 1.26
across all the variables. The low value for the variance inﬂation factors indicates that
collinearity is not a problem in our data.14
12We also estimate a model with the Holder67 variable as a measure of CEO overconﬁdence. As
suspected, the coeﬃcient on Holder67 is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero (see footnote 7).
13We also estimate a random-eﬀects tobit model with industry eﬀects. We follow Malmendier and
Tate (2008) and control for the following industries via indicator variables: Technical (SIC 1000-1799,
8711), Manufacturing ((SIC 2000-3999), Transportation (SIC 4000-4899), Trade (5000-5999), and Ser-
vice (SIC 7000-8710, 8712-8720, 8722-8999). Except for the nonsigniﬁcance of the size variable, the
results remain robust to the inclusion of industry eﬀects.
14Collinearity might be a problem if the largest variance inﬂation factor (VIF) is greater than ten
and the mean of the VIFs (across all independent variables) is substantially larger than one. For further
details, see Chatterjee, Hadi, and Price (2000).
21In Model 2, Table II, we use Pre- and Post-Longholder, in place of the Longholder
variable. The overall results are qualitatively similar to those in Model 1. The coeﬃcient
on Post-Longholder, however, has much stronger statistical signiﬁcance than that on the
Pre-Longholder variable. The results from this reﬁnement in our model speciﬁcation
suggest that the impact of overconﬁdence on dividend policy appears to be stronger
after the CEO has exhibited his/her overconﬁdence via his/her actions (i.e., delaying
option exercise until expiration).
[Table II here]
Our summary statistics in Table I indicate that, on average, Longholder CEOs have
a longer tenure with the ﬁrm. To ensure that the relation between Longholder and
dividend payout is not driven by a longer CEO tenure, we control for CEO tenure in our
analysis. The results, presented in Model 1, Table III, indicate that the negative relation
between Longholder and dividend payout is robust to the inclusion of CEO tenure. The
coeﬃcient on CEO tenure is nonsigniﬁcant and suggests that CEO tenure has no eﬀect
on dividend policy.
Fenn and Liang (2001) and Fama and French (2002) document a negative relation
between dividends and leverage. For robustness, we control for leverage in the random-
eﬀects tobit model even though leverage is not exogenous. We calculate leverage as the
ratio of total long-term debt plus the amount of (long-term) debt in current liabilities
to book value of assets. Our results indicate that the coeﬃcient on leverage is negative
and signiﬁcant and is consistent with the ﬁndings in Fama and French (2002) and in
Fenn and Liang (2002). Again, the negative relation between Longholder and dividend
payout is robust to the inclusion of leverage. The rest of the results remain qualitatively
the same. The results in Table III also remain qualitatively the same when we replace
Longholder with Pre-Longholder and Post-Longholder.
[Table III here]
We measure CEO overconﬁdence with the Longholder variable, which is based on the
option-exercise behavior of CEOs. Speciﬁcally, Longholder, a binary variable, equals
one for those CEOs who delay option exercise until the last year of the option’s life and
zero otherwise. An alternative explanation for the negative relation that we document
22between Longholder and dividend payout is that a lower dividend payout leads to delayed
option exercise. However, we do not believe that our ﬁndings result from this reverse
causality for the following ﬁve reasons.
First, our (untabulated) results indicate that there is no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀer-
ence in the median dividend yield between observations with Longholder = 1 and those
with Longholder = 0. Figure 2 shows our results for the option exercise boundaries based
on the assumptions of Hall and Murphy (2002) for three cases: no dividends, dividend
yield of 2.3% (the median for Longholder CEOs), and dividend yield of 2.9% (the mean
for Non-Longholder CEOs). There is little diﬀerence between the threshold moneyness
for the latter two cases suggesting that the delayed option-exercise of Longholder CEOs
does not appear to be caused by a lower dividend payout.
Second, our results in Table II indicate that the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on the
Post-Longholder variable is about 2.5 times as large as that on the Pre-Longholder
variable. Note that the Pre- and the Post-Longholder variables represent a split of the
Longholder variable for a given ﬁrm across time. If the option-exercise behavior of CEOs
is driven by the dividend payout of a ﬁrm, then there should not be such a systematic
diﬀerence in the relation between the dividend payout in the Pre and Post-Longholder
years.
Third, the reverse-causality argument suggests that ﬁrms with a lower dividend payout
have CEOs that exercise stock options late. However, it does not explain why some
ﬁrms have CEOs that suboptimally delay option exercise and also pay lower dividends
compared to other ﬁrms.
Fourth, if the reverse-causality explanation is true, then the relation between the
Longholder variable and dividend payout should be stronger in ﬁrms where CEOs hold
more options than in other ﬁrms. We test this hypothesis by interacting the Longholder
variable with i) a dummy variable that equals one for above-median holdings of Vested
Options and ii) with Vested Options itself. In either case, we do not ﬁnd any evidence
that the relation between dividend payout and the Longholder variable is stronger for
ﬁrms where CEOs hold more vested options.
Finally, we use an alternative measure of CEO overconﬁdence that is based on the
23Figure 2. Dividend Yield and Option Exercise Boundary
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characterization of the CEO by the press. Since press mentions of CEOs are unlikely
to be aﬀected by dividend policy, this variable allows for a clean and robust test of
the relation between CEO overconﬁdence and dividend policy. We estimate a random-
eﬀects tobit model of dividend payout with TOTALconﬁdent, the press-based measure
of CEO overconﬁdence. The rest of the explanatory variables are the same as in Model
1, Table II. The results under Model 1 in Table IV indicate that the coeﬃcient on
TOTALconﬁdent is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level. This conﬁrms the ﬁnding
with respect to Longholder and is consistent with Hypothesis 1. We also control for the
total number of CEO mentions and ﬁnd that our ﬁndings remain robust as documented
in Model 2, Table IV.
[Table IV here]
24We also examine the relation between total payout and CEO overconﬁdence. Following
Allen and Michaely (2003), we calculate total payout as the sum of dividends and share
repurchases divided by the market value of equity.15 We estimate a tobit model using
total payout as the dependent variable, with the independent variables the same as those
in Model 1, Table II. Our untabulated results indicate that the (negative) coeﬃcient on
the Longholder variable is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In a second tobit model,
we replace Longholder with Pre- and Post-Longholder and again ﬁnd the (negative)
coeﬃcients on Pre- and Post-Longholder not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Finally,
we use the press-based measure, TotalConﬁdent, as the measure of CEO overconﬁdence
and ﬁnd that its coeﬃcient is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In these models,
the rest of the results remain qualitatively the same as those when dividend payout is
used as the dependent variable.
The ﬁnance literature suggests important diﬀerences between dividends and repur-
chases, which may lead to these weaker results with respect to CEO overconﬁdence.
Dividends represent a stronger commitment to a stable policy and, accordingly, tend
to be paid out of permanent earnings. Repurchases, in contrast, are ﬂexible and more
volatile, and tend to be paid out of temporary cash ﬂows (Jagannathan, Stephens, and
Weisbach, 2000). In addition, ﬁrms appear to time repurchases in response to other con-
siderations such as when the stock price is low and when there is a build-up of cash (see
Allen and Michaely, 2003; Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005; Lie, 2000). As a
result, the irregular nature of repurchases introduces a notable element of randomness in
the total payout variable, which will be less predictable (and more noisy) than dividends
alone. In light of these basic diﬀerences, it is not surprising to ﬁnd much weaker results
when using total payout instead of dividend payout.
Growth opportunities, cash ﬂow, and ﬁrm size appear to be the three most important
factors that aﬀect dividend policy (see Smith and Watts, 1992; Fama and French, 2001,
2002). Firm size is widely accepted as a measure of asymmetric information in that
15Share repurchases equal the value of the purchase of common and preferred stock (compustat data
item 115) minus any reduction in the redemption value of preferred stock (compustat data item 56).
25larger ﬁrms have less asymmetric information (see Bhushan, 1989). Therefore, the evi-
dence on the relation between size and dividends suggests a link between dividend policy
and asymmetric information. Given these ﬁndings, we examine how the relations be-
tween dividend payout and growth, cash ﬂow, and the level of asymmetric information,
respectively, are inﬂuenced by CEO overconﬁdence. We use the Longholder measure of
overconﬁdence to assess how the dividend payout depends on the interaction between
overconﬁdence and these other determinants of dividend policy.
Hypothesis 2 predicts the diﬀerence in the dividend payout between overconﬁdent
and rational CEOs to be smaller for ﬁrms with existing projects of high quality. Our
(empirical) measure for growth opportunities represents the value of both assets in place
and future investments. This measure, however, is based on public information and can
thus be viewed as ”the typical asset” in the context of our model. A higher value for
our (empirical) growth measure corresponds to existing assets (or ”typical projects”) of
higher quality. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 predicts the negative relation between growth
and dividend payout to be weaker for ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs.
Our results in Model 1 in Table V are consistent with our hypothesis. The negative
coeﬃcients on growth and Longholder indicate that both higher growth and overconﬁ-
dence are associated with a lower dividend payout. The coeﬃcient on the interaction
term between growth and Longholder is positive. Taken together, these results indi-
cate that regardless of whether the CEOs are rational or overconﬁdent, a CEO in a
higher-growth ﬁrm pays a smaller dividend than a similar CEO in a lower-growth ﬁrm.
However, the diﬀerence in the dividend payout between higher-growth and lower-growth
ﬁrms is smaller for overconﬁdent CEOs than for rational CEOs. Stated equivalently, the
decline in dividend payout caused by CEO overconﬁdence is smaller for higher-growth
ﬁrms than for lower-growth ﬁrms.
Our model does not provide any predictions on the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on
the relation between dividend payout and cash ﬂow. Neither does the literature on
behavioral corporate ﬁnance. In spite of the lack of a predicted relation, we investigate
the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on the widely documented relation between dividend
policy and cash ﬂow. Our results in Model 2 in Table V indicate that the magnitude of
26the positive coeﬃcient on cash ﬂow is higher for ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs. One
possible explanation for this ﬁnding is that for a given level of cash ﬂow, an overconﬁdent
CEO perceives the future cash ﬂow to be higher relative to a rational CEO and thus
adopt a higher payout.
We draw on the existing literature on both corporate and behavioral ﬁnance to derive
a testable hypothesis concerning the inﬂuence of CEO overconﬁdence on the relation
between dividend payout and asymmetric information. Asymmetric information prob-
lems can make managers reluctant to raise funds through external sources, which might
lead to underinvestment (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Since overconﬁdent managers per-
ceive their ﬁrms to be undervalued (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2007), they would be
more reluctant to raise funds through external sources thus exacerbating the underin-
vestment problem caused by asymmetric information. One mechanism to control the
underinvestment problem is to increase ﬁnancial slack via a lower dividend payout (see
Fama and French, 2002). Here, the negative eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on dividend
payout is complemented by the negative eﬀect of asymmetric information. Therefore,
we expect the negative relation between asymmetric information and dividend payout
to be stronger for ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs.
We believe that ﬁrm size may also capture attributes of a ﬁrm other than informa-
tion asymmetry and that asset tangibility is a more accurate measure of information
asymmetry. Therefore, we control for ﬁrm size (via the logarithm of sales) and use
asset tangibility as a proxy for the level of asymmetric information. We calculate as-
set tangibility as the ratio of property, plant, and equipment to book value of assets.
The higher the asset tangibility, the lower the level of asymmetric information. The
results under Model 3 in Table V indicate that the coeﬃcient on asset tangibility is
positive. This ﬁnding indicates that ﬁrms with more asymmetric information pay lower
dividends. The results also indicate that the magnitude of the positive coeﬃcient on
asset tangibility is higher for ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs. Therefore, the negative
eﬀect of asymmetric information on dividend payout is stronger for ﬁrms with overconﬁ-
dent CEOs, consistent with our prediction. In the presence of asymmetric information,
overconﬁdent CEOs perceive a higher wedge between the cost of internal and external
27funds and, thus, respond by adopting a lower dividend payout to enhance the availability
of internal funds. This ﬁnding corroborates the evidence in Malmendier, Tate, and Yan
(2007), who document that overconﬁdent CEOs exhibit a pecking order behavior.
[Table V here]
B. Dividend Changes: Analysis of Stock Market Eﬀects. We use a standard
market-model methodology to measure the impact of dividend-increase announcements
on the stock price of announcing ﬁrms.16 To enhance the likelihood of a notable unex-
pected component in the announcements, we only include announcements of dividend
increases of at least 10%. This lower bound of 10% ensures that we include only econom-
ically signiﬁcant dividend increases. This approach is consistent with the extant body
of research on dividend changes. For instance, Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan
(2002) use dividend changes of at least 12.5% in their comprehensive study of dividend
changes. Their results remain robust when they consider dividend changes of at least
10%. The authors examine the frequency distribution of dividend changes and argue
that the lower bound of 12.5% (or 10%) seems to be the best in terms of including big
dividend changes. They also argue that dividend changes of at least 12.5% (or 10%) are
likely to be categorized as surprises (or unexpected changes) regardless of the underly-
ing dividend expectation model. To the extent that our lower bound of 10% may also
include dividend increases that are not unexpected, we introduce a bias against ﬁnd-
ing both statistically and economically signiﬁcant relations between the stock-market
response and the variables we use.
We identify 898 dividend-increase announcements, from CRSP, over our sample pe-
riod, 1980-1994. We use data from CRSP to estimate the market-model parameters.
The estimation period is 255 days and ends 46 trading days before the announcement
16The empirical evidence on dividend policy suggests that dividend increases are signiﬁcantly more
frequent than dividend decreases as ﬁrms are usually reluctant to decrease dividends. Based on the
data in Allen and Michaely (2003), the median (annual) number of dividend increases over the sample
period of our study, i.e., between 1980 and 1994, is 1635 and the median (annual) number of dividend
decreases is 95. Over this period, the minimum (maximum) number of dividend increases is 1072 (2513)
and the minimum (maximum) number of dividend decreases is 59 (322). Given the paucity of data on
dividend decreases, we focus on the sample of dividend increases.
28date. We compute cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over a three-day window that
begins the day before and ends the day after the announcement date. We estimate a
market model using the CRSP value-weighted index. The (untabulated) results from
the market model indicate that both the mean and the median three-day cumulative
abnormal return are signiﬁcantly positive, consistent with previous ﬁndings.
The positive market reaction to the dividend increase announcement is also consistent
with Hypothesis 3. Given our overconﬁdence measure, investors can ascribe overconﬁ-
dence with a greater likelihood when a CEO holds an option until expiration. Those
overconﬁdent CEOs, who have not held an option until expiration, will not be identiﬁed
as such. These unidentiﬁed overconﬁdent CEOs get pooled with the rational CEOs,
resulting in uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence. As proposition 4 suggests, an an-
nouncement of a dividend change provides information on both project quality and the
level of CEO overconﬁdence. A dividend increase announcement conveys information
that the project quality is poorer (implying a stock price decrease) and/or that the
CEO is less overconﬁdent implying lower overinvestment (and a higher stock price). In
our sample, the net stock price response across all ﬁrms is positive and suggests that
the dividend increase announcement, on average, appears to be more informative about
CEO overconﬁdence. This ﬁnding provides an alternative explanation of the positive
stock market response to dividend increase announcements.
Our objective, however, is to examine the relation between CEO overconﬁdence and
the stock-market response to dividend-increase announcements. A univariate compar-
ison of the CAR between Longholder CEOs and Non-Longholder CEOs yields no sta-
tistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the two groups. This result is not surprising as
the CAR is likely to be aﬀected by several factors that can easily confound the results
in a univariate analysis. Therefore, we employ a multivariate analysis and examine
the relation between the CAR and CEO overconﬁdence while controlling for relevant
attributes.
An OLS regression of the announcement-period returns or CAR (for dividend-increasing
ﬁrms only) may yield biased estimates of the parameters if the decision to increase div-
idends depends systematically on ﬁrm-speciﬁc attributes. A failure to control for this
29choice will introduce a selection bias in our empirical analysis. To control for a potential
selection bias, we estimate a regression model with sample selection using full maximum
likelihood. We use the Post-Longholder variable to measure CEO overconﬁdence. We do
not use the Longholder variable as it represents a managerial ﬁxed eﬀect and identiﬁes
the CEO as overconﬁdent in all ﬁrm-years. However, investors can ascribe overconﬁ-
dence only after the CEO has held the option until expiration. Thus, from the investors’
perspective, the Post-Longholder variable appropriately identiﬁes overconﬁdent CEOs.
The dependent variable in the selection equation is an indicator variable that equals
one if the ﬁrm increased its dividends, and zero otherwise. In the selection equation,
the independent variables are stock ownership, vested options, Pre-Longholder, Post-
Longholder, growth, cash ﬂow, log of sales, CEO tenure, and leverage. In the selection
equation, which examines the CEO’s decision to increase dividends, we use the Pre-
Longholder variable both for completeness and to examine if the decision to increase
dividends (by the CEO) diﬀers across Pre- and Post-Longholder years. The results,
reported in Table VI (under selection equation), indicate that the likelihood of a dividend
increase is positively related to Post-Longholder. The CEO becomes more likely to
increase dividends after he or he has held an option, for the ﬁrst time, until the ﬁnal
year of expiration. The coeﬃcient on the Pre-Longholder variable is nonsigniﬁcant.
The dependent variable in the regression equation is the three-day CAR based on the
value-weighted index. In the regression equation, the independent variables are stock
ownership, vested options, Post-Longholder, growth, cash ﬂow, log of sales, and the
percentage increase in dividends. The coeﬃcient on Post-Longholder is negative and
signiﬁcant (p = 0.038) and this ﬁnding is consistent with Hypothesis 4. For the subset
of ﬁrms with Post-Longholder CEOs, a dividend increase announcement conveys more
information about (poorer) project quality than about the level of overconﬁdence.17
17To see that the overconﬁdence of Post-Longholder CEOs is known more precisely, consider two
groups of CEOs: highly overconﬁdent with overconﬁdence C = CH + ￿ and less overconﬁdent with
overconﬁdence C = CL + ￿. A Post-Longholder CEO has been revealed to be a highly overconﬁdent
CEO while a CEO who is not a Post-Longholder may be highly conﬁdent with probability π. Then
V ar(C) = V ar(￿) for PostLongholder CEOs while V ar(C) = V ar(￿)+π(1 − π)(CH − CL)
2 > V ar(￿)
for CEOs who are not a Post-Longholder.
30In contrast, for the remaining ﬁrms, the dividend-increase announcement conveys rela-
tively more information about the level of overconﬁdence. Thus, the magnitude of the
positive reaction to the dividend-increase announcement is lower for ﬁrms managed by
Post-Longholder CEOs.
18These results indicate that the market response to dividend
announcements depends on investors’ perception of CEO overconﬁdence, among other
factors.
V. Model Extension: Endogenous Cost of Financing Future Investment
This section extends the model to show the robustness of our main result to endoge-
nizing the cost of external ﬁnancing. We also introduce a dynamic aspect to the model
so that the dividend is not simply residual of concurrent investment needs and is based
on expectation of future investment needs. These changes highlight the intuition that
overconﬁdent CEOs who view external ﬁnancing as excessively costly build ﬁnancial
slack for future investment needs by lowering dividend payout.
We modify the model in Section II by introducing an additional date, date 3. The
CEO still observes a signal about an investment project at date 0. However, this project
becomes available to the ﬁrm at date 2 rather than at date 1 and its cash ﬂow is realized
at date 3. For simplicity, we assume that the investment required for the project I is
ﬁxed but the may or may not invest in the project. The ﬁrm also makes an investment
at date 1 but there is no uncertainty about this investment. The ﬁrm starts with a
cash balance C0 and must maintain non-negative cash balance at all dates. At date 1,
the ﬁrm invests an amount I1 < C0 and this investment yields a payoﬀ of X at date 2.
The CEO determines the dividend D1 and the amount of external ﬁnancing to raise F1.
We eliminate the exogenous cost of external ﬁnancing in the main model by assuming
β = 0. The cash balance of the ﬁrm changes to C1 = C0 − I1 − D1 + F1. The ﬁrm may
hold an arbitrarily high amount of cash indeﬁnitely if there is no cost of holding cash .
To prevent this unrealistic scenario, we assume that cash balance is dissipated between
18A likelihood ratio test overwhelmingly rejects the null hypothesis of zero correlation between the
selection and regression equations in our model of sample selection. This ﬁnding suggests that the
dividend increases we study are not random choices and, thus, a simple OLS model would have produced
biased estimates of the parameters.
31dates 1 and 2 and between dates 2 and 3 so that a cash balance of Ct at Date t ∈ {1,2}
reduces to g(Ct) at Date t+1 where g(0) = 0,g0(0) = 1, and g00 < 0. This cost could be
thought of as the opportunity cost of holding liquid assets or agency cost of maintaining
cash as in Jensen (1986).
We assume that the ﬁrm needs external ﬁnancing at date 1 or at date 2 if it invests in
the project at date 2: I > g (C0 − I1)+X. At date 2, the CEO determines the dividend
D2 and the amount of external ﬁnancing to be raised F2. The new cash balance C2
equals g (C1)+X −I −D2 +F2 if the CEO invests and g (C1)+X −D2 +F2 otherwise.
If the ﬁrm invests at date 2, the investment yields Y f (I) at date 3 so the ﬁrm distributes
g (C2) + Y f (I) to investors. If the ﬁrm does not invest at date 2, it distributes g (C2)
to investors.
We now analyze the cash balance the ﬁrm maintains. First note that the ﬁrm does
not hold any cash balance after date 2 (C2 = 0) because holding cash is costly so it is
better to pay out cash as dividend at date 2 rather than at date 3. The ﬁrm’s actions at
date 1 depend on whether it will invest at date 2. The CEO bases this decision on the
signal observed at date 0 about the project quality. If the ﬁrm is not going to invest at
date 2, it does not hold any cash after date 1. If it is going to invest at date 2, it may
hold cash to reduce the amount of external ﬁnancing necessary for ﬁnancing the project
at date 2. The ﬁrm’s actions at date 1 help investors noisily infer the CEO’s signal. All
uncertainty is resolved at date 1 and everyone anticipates the equilibrium behavior at
date 2.
Next, consider the ﬁnancing decisions. First note that the ﬁrm will never raise ex-
ternal ﬁnancing and pay dividends simultaneously. Raising external ﬁnancing to simul-
taneously pay out dividend is a positive-NPV transaction for current shareholders only
if the ﬁrm’s securities are undervalued so in equilibrium, new investors will not provide
capital for dividend payout. The ﬁrm has suﬃcient cash to invest at date 1 (C0 > I1).
Since there is a cost of retaining cash, the ﬁrm would prefer to raise external ﬁnancing
at date 2 rather than raise external ﬁnancing at date 1 for investment at date 2. Thus,
no external ﬁnancing is raised at date 1, F1 = 0. At date 2, the ﬁrm may raise external
ﬁnancing for investment only if it does not pay any dividend (D2 = 0) or retain cash
32(C2 = 0).
Now, we focus on the dividend decision at date 1. If the CEO is not going to invest
at date 2, he pays dividend D1 = C0 − I1 to bring cash balance C1 to zero. If the
CEO is going to invest at date 1, the dividend decision depends on the perceived cost
of date-2 external ﬁnancing which in turn depends on the perceived underpricing of
equity. Let yC be the CEO’s estimate of the project quality and let yM (D1) be the
market’s expectation of the project quality as inferred from dividend D1. Note that the
market cannot noiselessly recover the CEO’s signal because the dividend D1 depends on
the CEO’s signal as well as the CEO’s overconﬁdence that is unknown to the market.
The CEO believes that the value of the ﬁrm after the events at date 2 equals yCf (I).
The investors’ estimate of that value equals yM (D)f (I). The equity will be priced
so that new investors at date 2 expect to get a stake which equals their contribution
F2. Thus, original shareholders will retain a fraction (yM (D)f (I) − F2)/(yM (D)f (I))
that is decreasing in the amount of external ﬁnancing raised. The latter is just suﬃcient
to bridge the gap between the ﬁrm’s investment need and its cash balance: F2 = I −
g (C1)−X = I−g(C0 − I1 − D1)−X. Thus, the CEO believes that the stake of original
shareholders in the ﬁrm is worth
yC
yM(D1)f(I) − I + g (C0 − I1 − D1) + X
yM(D1)
. (8)
The CEO believes this stake to be more valuable if he estimates the project quality
yC to be higher and also when the investors’ estimate the project yM(D1) to be higher
because that enables the ﬁrm to get better terms on external ﬁnancing. At date 1, the
CEO’s dividend decision maximizes the total payoﬀ to the original shareholders: the
dividend payout D1 and their stake in the ﬁrm as given by (8). Thus, conditional on




yM(D1)f(I) − I + g(C0 − I1 − D1) + X
yM(D1)
. (9)
The CEO’s investment decision is based on a comparison of (9) with the following
payoﬀ to shareholders when the ﬁrm does not invest at date 2:
33C0 − I1 + X. (10)
Note that the CEO’s overconﬁdence C and the private signal s enter the CEO’s
problem in (9) and (10) only through the CEO’s estimate of project quality yC so the
CEO’s decisions must depend only on yC. Consider a value of yC such that the CEO
invests at date 2. This requires that (9) exceeds (10). Since the dividend D1 ≤ C0 − I1
in (9) is less than the payoﬀ in (10), the coeﬃcient of yc must be positive in (9). Then,
(9) will continue to exceed (10) for even higher values of yC. Thus, the CEO will invest
at date 2 precisely if his estimate of project quality yC exceeds a threshold ¯ yC.
The equilibrium must be of a form in which a CEO declares maximum dividend of
C0 − I1 at date 1 and doesn’t invest at date 2 if he estimates project quality yC < ¯ yC,
and declares dividend D1 = h(yC) and invests at date 2 if yC > ¯ yC. We assume that h is
invertible so on observing less than maximum dividend, investors infer expected project




D1 + yCf(I) −
yC
yM(D1)
{I − g (C0 − I1 − D1) − X}. (11)
This objective is maximized when the CEO follows equilibrium dividend policy. If the
equilibrium dividend level for a CEO who estimates project quality as yC is D1 = D∗ ≡















A CEO who estimates a higher project quality ˆ yC > yC will prefer to pay lower
dividend at date 1 because the objective in (11) is decreasing in D1 at D1 = D∗. This is















The inequality is obtained from (12) and ˆ yC > yC. The intuition is that a CEO
choosing less than maximum dividend payout is trading oﬀ the beneﬁt of higher payout
34to investors versus the cost of reduced future payoﬀ to investors. A more overconﬁdent
CEO perceives the cost of dividend payout to be higher because he perceives the external
ﬁnancing that will be needed in future following a larger dividend payout to be more
costly due to equity undervaluation. Thus, a CEO with a higher estimate of project
quality pays a lower dividend. A higher estimate of project quality can result from a
higher signal about the project quality or from higher CEO overconﬁdence.
We draw two main results from this analysis. First, a more overconﬁdent CEO is more
likely to invest in the project at date 2 than a less overconﬁdent or rational CEO even
when both observe the same signal. Second, conditional on investing in the project at
date 2, the ﬁrm led by a more overconﬁdent CEO declares lower dividend at date 1 than
a ﬁrm led by a less overconﬁdent or rational CEO even if the two CEOs observe the same
signal about the project quality. The reason for the overinvestment by the overconﬁdent
CEO is the overestimation of the project quality compared to a rational CEO. The reason
for the lower dividend payout by the overconﬁdent CEO is that the overconﬁdent CEO
perceives equity as more undervalued and hence external ﬁnancing as more costly than
does a rational CEO. While the model in Section II showed that an overconﬁdent CEO
may reduce dividend payout in order to increase concurrent investment, this extension
shows that the reduction in dividend may also be motivated by a desire to build internal
capital for future investment when external ﬁnancing is perceived to be costly.
VI. Conclusion
Our model of the eﬀect of CEO overconﬁdence on dividend policy yields several
testable predictions that we examine empirically. The main testable prediction is that an
overconﬁdent CEO pays a lower level of dividends relative to a rational CEO. Our model
also predicts the diﬀerence in the dividend payout between higher and lower-growth ﬁrms
to be smaller in ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs. Another prediction is that the
stock price response to announcements of dividend changes is an increasing function of
the uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence. We test these predictions, along with other
implications from the dividend literature, using a panel data of large U.S. companies.
We use the measures of CEO overconﬁdence derived by and used in Malmendier and
Tate (2005, 2008) and in Malmendier,Tate, and Yan (2007).
35Consistent with our main prediction, we ﬁnd that the level of dividend payout is lower
in ﬁrms managed by overconﬁdent CEOs. Next, we document that the diﬀerence in the
dividend payout between higher-growth and lower-growth ﬁrms is smaller for ﬁrms with
overconﬁdent CEOs. This ﬁnding indicates that the reduction in dividend payout caused
by CEO overconﬁdence is smaller in higher-growth ﬁrms and is also consistent with the
prediction of our model. We also document that, in ﬁrms with overconﬁdent CEOs, both
the positive relation between dividend payout and cash ﬂow and the negative relation
between asymmetric information and dividend payout are stronger.
Finally, we analyze market perceptions about the relation between CEO overconﬁ-
dence and dividend policy by examining the stock price response to announcements of
dividend increases by our sample ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that the magnitude of the positive stock
price response to announcements of dividend increases is higher in ﬁrms in which there is
uncertainty about the level of CEO’s overconﬁdence. This ﬁnding is consistent with our
hypothesis that dividends provide information about CEO overconﬁdence. Speciﬁcally,
dividend increases indicate lower CEO overconﬁdence and that this informativeness is
higher when there is greater uncertainty about CEO overconﬁdence.
36APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: (a) With β = 0, (3) and (4) can be combined to get
Z (s,I,D,F) = Z (s,I) = y (s)f (I) − I + C0 (14)





< 0. (because f
0 (I) < f
0(0) = 1/y(s) ≤ 1/y(s))
Thus, optimal investment is 0. The result about net payout follows from (4).
(b) Deﬁne I∗ (s) by
f
0 (I
∗ (s)) = 1/y(s). (15)
I∗ (s) is the optimal investment level because it maximizes the CEO’s objective in (14).
Further, it is increasing in s because y(s) is increasing in s (see (1)). The result about
net payout follows from (4). ￿
Proof of Lemma 1: Combining (3) and (4) in the problem (3)-(5), we get
Z (s,I) = max
D,F
y (s)f (I) − I + C0 − βF (16)
subject to
D = C0 + (1 − β)F − I ≥ 0, and (17)
F ≥ 0. (18)
If I ≤ C0, (17) follows from (18) and can be ignored. The optimal solution is F = 0 and
D = C0 −I. If I > C0, (18) follows from (17) and can be ignored. The optimal solution
is D = 0 and F = (I − C0)/(1 − β). Substituting the two solutions in (16) gives the
desired expression for Z. ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: (a) For I > 0,




0 (x) − 1}dx
< C0 (because f
0 (x) < f
0(0) = 1/y(s) ≤ 1/y(s))
= Z (s,0,C0,0) ≤ Z (s,0).
37Thus, optimal investment is 0. The results about dividends and external ﬁnancing follow
from Lemma 1.
(b) Deﬁne I∗ (s) as in (15). Since s < s < ˆ s, (15) and (6) imply that 0 < I∗ (s) < C0.
Further, I∗ (s) maximizes y(s)f (I) − I so for arbitrary I ≥ 0,
Z (s,I
∗(s),C0 − I
∗ (s),0) = y(s)f (I
∗ (s)) − I
∗ (s) + C0
≥ y(s)f (I) − I + C0 ≥ Z (s,I) ,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 1. Thus, optimal investment is I∗ (s).
Further, it is increasing in s because y(s) is increasing in s and f is concave in (15). The
results about dividends and external ﬁnancing follow from Lemma 1.
(c) For I < C0,





≥ y (s)f (I) − I + C0
= Z (s,I) (from Lemma 1),
where the inequality follows because f0(x) > f0(C0) = 1/y(ˆ s) ≤ 1/y(s).
For I > C0,













≥ y (s)f (I) −
I − C0
1 − β
= Z (s,I) (from Lemma 1),












Since s > ¯ s, (6) and (19) imply that I∗ (s) > C0. Further, I∗ (s) maximizes y (s)f (I)−
38I/(1 − β). For I ≥ C0,
Z (s,I
∗ (s)) = y (s)f (I
∗(s)) −
I∗ (s) − C0
1 − β
≥ y (s)f (I) −
I − C0
1 − β
= Z (s,I) (from Lemma 1).
For I ≤ C0,
Z (s,I




0 (x) − 1}dx
≥ y(s)f (I) − I + C0
= Z (s,I) ,
where the inequality follows from f0 (x) > f0 (C0) = 1/y(ˆ s) > 1/y (s). ￿
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that the signal thresholds s, ˆ s, and ¯ s in (6) depend on C













From (2) and (20), s > µy, so for s < µy, I = 0 regardless of C. Now, consider s > µy.
From lemma 1, we get
d2
dI dC




y (s,C) > 0,
because for s > µy, y (s,C) is an increasing function of C (see (7)). Thus, if a CEO
with lower C is indiﬀerent towards or prefers a higher I, a CEO with higher C prefers
a higher I. Thus, I is increasing in C.
Next, consider I2 > I1. If C0 > I2 > I1, then using Lemma 1, we get
Z (s,I2) − Z (s,I1) = y (s,C){f (I2) − f (I1)} − (I2 − I1) .
If I2 > C0 > I1, then,
Z (s,I2) − Z (s,I1) = y (s,C){f (I2) − f (I1)} −
I2 − C0
1 − β
+ (I1 − C0) .
If I2 > I1 > C0, then,




39In the ﬁrst of the three cases above, Z (s,I2) − Z (s,I1) is independent of β while
in the remaining two cases it is decreasing in β. Thus, Z (s,I2) − Z (s,I1) is weakly
decreasing in β. Similarly, Z (s,I2)− Z (s,I1) is increasing in C0 in the second case but
independent of C0 in the other two cases so Z (s,I2) − Z (s,I1) is weakly increasing in
C0. Thus, the optimal investment must be weakly decreasing in β and weakly increasing
in C0.
In parts (b) and (c), dD
dC ≤ 0 and dF
dC ≥ 0 follow from part (a) and Lemma 1. Consider
the eﬀect of initial cash C0. If dividend D > 0, investment I is not constrained by initial
cash C0. An increase in C0 leaves I unchanged and increases D. If D = 0, an increase
in C0 cannot decrease D further. Thus, dD
dC0 ≥ 0. Similarly, if the amount of capital
raised through external ﬁnancing F > 0, investment I exceeds initial cash C0 and is
determined by (19). A decrease in C0 leaves I unchanged and increases F. If F = 0, a
decrease in C0 cannot decrease F further. Thus, dF
dC0 ≤ 0.
Finally, consider the eﬀect of cost of external ﬁnancing β. If F > 0, investment
I is determined by (19), which shows that a decrease in β increases I which in turn
increases F (from Lemma 1). If F = 0, a decrease in β cannot decrease F further.
Thus, dF
dβ ≤ 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 4: When there is no uncertainty about s, a higher dividend con-
veys no information about s but indicates lower overconﬁdence C and results in a
share price increase because a less overconﬁdent CEO overinvests to a lesser extent
(see Proposition 3). When there is uncertainty about s as well as C, the share price
at dividend announcement equals the expected value of Z (s,I) minus expected loss
from underpricing to new investors at date 1. However, since all investors are ra-
tional and the ﬁrm raises capital in a competitive market, new securities are fairly
priced based on rational investors’ expectations. Thus, the share price equals the
expected value of Z (s,I). Let P (D) be the share price when dividend is D and
no external capital is raised (F = 0). From (3) and (4), the share price with full
payout is P (C0) = C0. From (3), (4), and (15), the share price with partial pay-
out (0 < D < C0) is P (D) = E [y (s,1)|y (s,C) = 1/f0(C0 − D)]f (C0 − D) + D.
The sensitivity of share price change to dividends is proportional to P (C0) − P (D),
40which is decreasing in E [y(s,1)|y (s,C) = 1/f0 (C0 − D)]. Thus, we need to show
that E [s|y (s,C) = 1/f0(C0 − D)] is decreasing in uncertainty about C. Deﬁne x ≡
1/(Cηs). Since a distribution with greater uncertainty in the second-order-stochastic
dominance sense can be achieved through a series of mean preserving spreads (see Mas-
Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995)), we compare two cases: one in which x has a point
distribution and another a binary distribution, representing a mean preserving spread
around the point distribution. To ensure that the distributions diﬀer only in uncertainty
and not in mean, we shall keep E [x] ﬁxed for the two cases. First consider the point
distribution with x = x. From (7), we get
E [s|y (s,C) = 1/f
0(C0 − D)] = (1 + ηyx)
￿
1




Now consider the binary distribution such that x = xH with probability π and x = xL
with probability 1 − π where xH > xL and
πx
H + (1 − π)x
L = x. (22)























The expected value of s, using Bayes rule, is
E [s|y(s,C) = 1/f








πf (sH) + (1 − π)f (sL)
< πs
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as (23) and (24) show that sH >
41sL > µy. Comparison of (21) and (25) shows that when there is more uncertainty about
C (or x), E [s] is lower so stock price reaction is more sensitive to dividend payout. ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: (a) In absence of the typical project, Proposition 2 shows that
investment is a weakly increasing function and dividend is a weakly decreasing function
of the signal s. Further, since, the signal aﬀects the CEO’s choice solely through its eﬀect
on y(s,C), investment is an increasing function I∗(y(s,C)) while dividend is a decreasing
function D∗(y(s,C)). The sole eﬀect of the access to the typical project is that the CEO
prefers the novel project over the typical project if y(s,C) > Q and the typical project
over the novel project if y(s,C) < Q. Thus, CEO’s policy depends on max(Q,y(s,C))
with investment I∗(max(Q,y(s,C))) and dividend D∗(max(Q,y(s,C))).

































× 1(Q < y (s,C)) , (26)
where indicator function 1(A) equals 1 if expression A is true and 0 otherwise. The ﬁrst
term on the right hand side of (26) is positive from Proposition 3 while the second term
is a decreasing function of Q so dI/dC is decreasing in Q.






× 1(Q < y(s,C)) .
Since the ﬁrst term on the right hand side is negative while the second term is decreasing
in Q, dD/dC is increasing in Q. ￿
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46Table I
Summary Statistics: Longholder CEO Firms vs. Non-Longholder CEO Firms
Stock Ownership is the ratio of total shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number
of shares outstanding. Vested options equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months
of the beginning of the year) as a fraction of shares outstanding. Longholder is a binary variable that equals
1 if the CEO held an option package until the last year before expiration at least once during his/her tenure
and the option package held was at least 40% in the money entering its ﬁnal year. Growth equals the ratio of
the market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the market value
of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity. Cash Flow equals the ratio of
operating income before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the natural logarithm of
sales. Leverage equals the ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the
CEO (in years) with the ﬁrm. We base the summary statistics on pooled observations (across ﬁrms and time)
with available data for the variables.
Longholder CEOs Non-Longholder CEOs
Standard Standard
Variable Mean Median Deviation Mean Median Deviation
Dividends to Market 0.024 0.023 0.02 0.029 0.024 0.11
Value of Equity
Book Value of Assets 3427.91 1768.77 5706.75 3961.40 1904.83 6576.33
(in $ millions)
Sales (in $ millions) 3846.03 2234.89 4894.28 4398.17 2345.08 6347.38
Stock Ownership 0.016 0.003 0.04 0.031 0.002 0.09
Vested Options 0.066 0.021 0.14 0.017 0.005 0.04
Growth 1.751 1.451 1.03 1.625 1.312 1.01
Cash Flow 0.179 0.171 0.09 0.158 0.153 0.08
Leverage 0.214 0.208 0.13 0.238 0.223 0.15
CEO Tenure (years) 10.88 9.00 7.20 8.34 6.00 7.60
Observations 573 2236Table II
Does CEO Overconﬁdence Aﬀect Dividend Payout?
This table provides estimates from a random-eﬀects tobit model, which is estimated on the pooled data.
The dependent variable equals the ratio of total dividends to market value of equity. Stock Ownership is the
ratio of total shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number of shares outstanding.
Vested options equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months of the beginning of the
year) as a fraction of shares outstanding. Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO held an
option package until the last year before expiration at least once during his/her tenure and the option package
held was at least 40% in the money entering its ﬁnal year. Post-Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1
for all CEO-years after the CEO, for the ﬁrst time, holds the option package until expiration. Pre-Longholder
is a binary variable that equals 1 for CEO-years where Post-Longholder equals 0 and Longholder equals 1.
Growth equals the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets
equals the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity. Cash
Flow equals the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the
natural logarithm of sales.
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>z
Constant -0.0052 -0.37 0.708 -0.0089 -0.71 0.481
Stock Ownership -0.0356 -2.41 0.016** -0.0382 -5.07 0.000***
Vested Options -0.0372 -2.99 0.003*** -0.0390 -3.56 0.000***
Longholder -0.0040 -2.62 0.009***
Post-Longholder -0.0066 -4.04 0.000***
Pre-Longholder -0.0026 -1.72 0.085*
Growth -0.0104 -13.39 0.000*** -0.0102 -14.04 0.000***
Cash Flow 0.0454 5.68 0.000*** 0.0449 6.34 0.000***
Log of Sales 0.0018 2.95 0.003*** 0.0019 3.42 0.001***
Observations 2809 2809
Number of Firms 244 244
Log Likelihood 4510.07 4513.10
χ2 328.39*** 363.42***
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 0.10 level.Table III
CEO Overconﬁdence and Dividend Payout: Controlling for CEO Tenure and Leverage
This table provides estimates from a random-eﬀects tobit model, which is estimated on the pooled data.
The dependent variable equals the ratio of total dividends to market value of equity. Stock Ownership is the
ratio of total shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number of shares outstanding.
Vested options equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months of the beginning of the
year) as a fraction of shares outstanding. Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO held an
option package until the last year before expiration at least once during his/her tenure and the option package
held was at least 40% in the money entering its ﬁnal year. Growth equals the ratio of the market value of
assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the
book value of total assets minus the book value of equity. Cash Flow equals the ratio of operating income
before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the natural logarithm of sales. CEO Tenure
is the tenure of the CEO (in years) with the ﬁrm. Leverage equals the ratio of long-term debt to book value
of assets.
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>z
Constant -0.0066 -0.54 0.589 -0.0055 -0.46 0.646
Stock Ownership -0.0368 -6.12 0.000*** -0.0373 -5.78 0.000***
Vested Options -0.0364 -3.47 0.001*** -0.0396 -4.03 0.000***
Longholder -0.0039 -2.53 0.012** -0.0047 -3.79 0.000***
Growth -0.0104 -12.03 0.000*** -0.0102 -15.89 0.000***
Cash Flow 0.0477 6.64 0.000*** 0.0405 5.84 0.000***
Log of Sales 0.0018 3.34 0.001*** 0.0019 3.51 0.000***
CEO Tenure -0.0001 -1.36 0.172
Leverage -0.0085 -2.56 0.011**
Observations 2775 2806
Number of Firms 242 244
Log Likelihood 4476.41 4513.62
χ2 315.44*** 420.22***
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 0.10 level.Table IV
CEO Overconﬁdence and Dividend Payout: Press Measures of Overconﬁdence
This table provides estimates from a random-eﬀects tobit model, which is estimated on the pooled data.
The dependent variable equals the ratio of total dividends to market value of equity. Stock Ownership is the
ratio of total shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number of shares outstanding.
Vested options equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months of the beginning of
the year) as a fraction of shares outstanding. TOTALconﬁdent is a binary variable that equals 1 when the
number of "conﬁdent" and "optimistic" mentions for a CEO exceeds the number of "not conﬁdent", "not
optimistic", and "reliable, cautious, practical, conservative, steady, frugal" mentions. TOTALmentions is the
total number of articles mentioning the CEO in both searches. Both TOTALconﬁdent and TOTALmentions
are based on the total number of articles over the sample period up to the previous year. Growth equals the
ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the market
value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity. Cash Flow equals the ratio
of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the natural logarithm of
sales.
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>z
Constant -0.0307 -3.02 0.003*** -0.0342 -3.36 0.001***
Stock Ownership -0.0305 -5.83 0.000*** -0.0299 -5.63 0.000***
Vested Options -0.0340 -5.13 0.000*** -0.0331 -4.99 0.000***
TOTALconﬁdent -0.0045 -5.05 0.000*** -0.0042 -4.66 0.000***
TOTALmentions -0.00001 -1.90 0.058*
Growth -0.0096 -16.70 0.000*** -0.0096 -16.69 0.000***
Cash Flow 0.0369 6.29 0.000*** 0.0359 6.08 0.000***
Log of Sales 0.0030 6.52 0.000*** 0.0031 6.89 0.000***
Observations 2432 2432
Number of Firms 245 245
Log Likelihood 2509.55 2511.24
χ2 573.42*** 582.46***
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 0.10 level.Table V
CEO Overconﬁdence and Dividend Payout: Interactive Eﬀects of Overconﬁdence with Growth Opportunities, Cash Flow, and
Asymmetric Information
This table provides estimates from a random-eﬀects tobit model, which is estimated on the pooled data. The dependent variable equals the ratio of
total dividends to market value of equity. Stock Ownership is the ratio of total shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number of
shares outstanding. Vested options equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months of the beginning of the year) as a fraction of
shares outstanding. Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 if the CEO held an option package until the last year before expiration at least once
during his/her tenure and the option package held was at least 40% in the money entering its ﬁnal year. Growth equals the ratio of the market value
of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book
value of equity. Cash Flow equals the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the natural logarithm
of sales. Asset Tangibility equals the ratio of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) to book value of assets.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable Coeﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>z
Constant -0.0067 -0.60 0.548 -0.0053 -0.41 0.679 0.0261 14.28 0.000***
Stock Ownership -0.0318 -4.16 0.000*** -0.0312 -4.47 0.000*** -0.0448 -8.32 0.000***
Vested Options -0.0380 -3.77 0.000*** -0.0332 -3.83 0.000*** -0.0406 -5.12 0.001***
Longholder -0.0101 -4.57 0.000*** -0.0113 -4.37 0.000*** -0.0010 -3.01 0.003***
Longholder*Growth 0.0036 3.50 0.000***
Longholder*Cash Flow 0.0443 3.42 0.001***
Longholder*Asset Tangibility 0.0147 1.95 0.052*
Growth -0.0119 -19.15 0.000*** -0.0112 -12.76 0.000*** -0.0090 -15.86 0.000***
Cash Flow 0.0429 5.97 0.000*** 0.0426 5.52 0.000*** 0.0543 7.73 0.000***
Log of Sales 0.0020 3.96 0.000*** 0.0018 3.19 0.001***
Asset Tangibility 0.0103 3.52 0.000***
Observations 2809 2809 2802
Number of Firms 244 244 244
Log Likelihood 4515.73 4512.71 4507.03
χ2 527.89*** 268.01*** 446.83***
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level; ** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level; * Signiﬁcant at the 0.10 level.Table VI
Announcements of Dividend Increases: Stock Market Eﬀects and CEO Overconﬁdence
This table provides the maximum likelihood estimates from a regression model with sample selection.
In the selection equation, the dependent variable equals one if the ﬁrm announced a dividend increase of
at least 10% and zero otherwise. In the regression equation, the dependent variable equals the three-day
cumulative abnormal return associated with the dividend-increase announcement. The sample contains 899
dividend-increase announcements (or has uncensored observations). Stock Ownership is the ratio of total
shares (owned by the CEO and his immediate family) to the number of shares outstanding. Vested options
equals the CEO’s ownership of options (exercisable within six months of the beginning of the year) as a
fraction of shares outstanding. Post-Longholder is a binary variable that equals 1 for all CEO-years after the
CEO, for the ﬁrst time, holds the option package until expiration. Pre-Longholder is a binary variable that
equals 1 for CEO-years where Post-Longholder equals 0 and Longholder equals 1. Longholder is a binary
variable that equals 1 if the CEO held an option package until the last year before expiration at least once
during his/her tenure and the option package held was at least 40% in the money entering its ﬁnal year.
Growth equals the ratio of the market value of assets to book value of assets, where the market value of assets
equals the market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity. Cash
Flow equals the ratio of operating income before depreciation to book value of assets. Log of Sales equals the
natural logarithm of sales. CEO Tenure is the tenure of the CEO (in years) with the ﬁrm. Leverage equals the
ratio of long-term debt to book value of assets. Dividend Increase is the percentage increase in the dividend
from the preceding period.
Selection Equation Regression Equation
Variable Coeﬃcient z Pr>zC o e ﬃcient z Pr>z
Constant -4.0398 -7.26 0.000*** 0.0832 2.87 0.004***
Stock Ownership 0.4900 1.33 0.183 0.0332 1.68 0.093*
Vested Options -1.0854 -2.64 0.008*** 0.0776 3.10 0.002***
Post-Longholder 0.2248 2.32 0.020** -0.0088 -2.07 0.038**
Pre-Longholder -0.1225 -1.61 0.108
Growth -0.0000 -0.00 1.000 -0.0001 -0.04 0.964
Cash Flow 6.8291 15.07 0.000*** -0.1200 -4.50 0.000***
Log of Sales 0.1132 4.59 0.000*** -0.0013 -1.09 0.275
CEO Tenure -0.0017 -0.48 0.632
Leverage -0.1233 -0.69 0.489





χ2 for LR Test (ρ = 0) 13.32***
*** Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
** Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
*S i g n i ﬁcant at the 0.10 level.1 
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